2014/04/27
Video - Trás-os-Montes: O Reino Maravilhoso de Miguel Torga
Música: Busindre Reel, de Jose Angel Hevia
2014/04/26
2012/07/03
2012/02/28
Económico-Financeiro: O erro de Ricardo Reis
Económico-Financeiro: O erro de Ricardo Reis: O Ricardo Reis escreve semanalmente no Dinheiro Vivo. Estimado Ricardo, há umas semanas escreveste uma coluna no DV em que falaste da ac...
2011/12/30
The crisis and the blogosphere have opened mainstream economics up to new attack
Heterodox economics: Marginal revolutionaries | The Economist
...
The bygone and the marginalised always look strange. But would it not also be strange to imagine that, in 30 or 50 years, economic historians will look back on the current crisis and say that mainstream macroeconomics offered the best analysis and prescriptions that could have been conceived? If they agree that it did not, then there seems a chance that they will think perspectives outside the mainstream might have helped.
Decades ago macroeconomics resembled an “intellectual witch’s brew”, according to Olivier Blanchard, chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. It contained “many ingredients, some of them exotic—many insights, but also a great deal of confusion”. Things then became more rigorous and refined: disagreements remained, but within set limits. Now, on the blogs, the economic conversation boils and bubbles again. That ferment is surely spreading into the academy—and in time some new quintessence will be brought forth, perhaps from materials now considered base.
...
The bygone and the marginalised always look strange. But would it not also be strange to imagine that, in 30 or 50 years, economic historians will look back on the current crisis and say that mainstream macroeconomics offered the best analysis and prescriptions that could have been conceived? If they agree that it did not, then there seems a chance that they will think perspectives outside the mainstream might have helped.
Decades ago macroeconomics resembled an “intellectual witch’s brew”, according to Olivier Blanchard, chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. It contained “many ingredients, some of them exotic—many insights, but also a great deal of confusion”. Things then became more rigorous and refined: disagreements remained, but within set limits. Now, on the blogs, the economic conversation boils and bubbles again. That ferment is surely spreading into the academy—and in time some new quintessence will be brought forth, perhaps from materials now considered base.
2011/12/18
Económico-Financeiro: A criação da banca comercial
Económico-Financeiro: A criação da banca comercial: O Condado da Negralhada ainda é grandinho. Tem a capital e depois tem 8 aldeias retiradas uns 15 kilometros. A capital tem 200 habitantes e...
2011/12/14
A disastrous failure at the summit - FT.com
A disastrous failure at the summit - FT.com
Martin Wolf
Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad. That was my reaction to the outcome of last week’s meeting of the European Union’s Council...
The core decision was to strengthen fiscal discipline, so building what Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, last week called a “stability and growth union” – or, as I think of it, an “instability and stagnation union”...
.. the Commission – a body of unelected bureaucrats – would impose sanctions on elected governments, when the latter are under great pressure. What is the Commission going to do if they still fail to comply? Take them over? The answer, we now know, is: yes. This is a constitutional monstrosity.
Still more important, as professor Kevin O’Rourke of Oxford university argues on Project Syndicate, is that it is also an economic monstrosity. Let me make this point by turning last week’s analysis of the balance of payments into one of foreign, private and government financial balances in eurozone members (see charts). To remind readers: these have to add up to zero, by definition. But how they go about adding up is revealing.
As I noted last week, fiscal imbalances were modest before the crisis, but the current account imbalances were huge. Surplus private funds in some countries (notably Germany and the Netherlands) were intermediated by the financial system to fund private deficits in others (notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). When crisis hit, these flows ceased. Deficits of private sectors collapsed (most turning into surpluses), while fiscal deficits exploded. Now, says Germany, the latter must be slashed.
...
The eurozone has no credible plan to fix the flaws of the eurozone, apart from greater fiscal austerity: there is to be no fiscal, financial or political union; and there is to be no balanced mechanism for economic adjustment on both sides of the creditor-debtor divide. The decision is, instead, to try still harder with a stability and growth pact whose failures have been both predictable and persistent. Yes, Mr Cameron made a blunder last week. But that of the eurozone looks far bigger.
Martin Wolf
Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad. That was my reaction to the outcome of last week’s meeting of the European Union’s Council...
The core decision was to strengthen fiscal discipline, so building what Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, last week called a “stability and growth union” – or, as I think of it, an “instability and stagnation union”...
.. the Commission – a body of unelected bureaucrats – would impose sanctions on elected governments, when the latter are under great pressure. What is the Commission going to do if they still fail to comply? Take them over? The answer, we now know, is: yes. This is a constitutional monstrosity.
Still more important, as professor Kevin O’Rourke of Oxford university argues on Project Syndicate, is that it is also an economic monstrosity. Let me make this point by turning last week’s analysis of the balance of payments into one of foreign, private and government financial balances in eurozone members (see charts). To remind readers: these have to add up to zero, by definition. But how they go about adding up is revealing.
As I noted last week, fiscal imbalances were modest before the crisis, but the current account imbalances were huge. Surplus private funds in some countries (notably Germany and the Netherlands) were intermediated by the financial system to fund private deficits in others (notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). When crisis hit, these flows ceased. Deficits of private sectors collapsed (most turning into surpluses), while fiscal deficits exploded. Now, says Germany, the latter must be slashed.
...
The eurozone has no credible plan to fix the flaws of the eurozone, apart from greater fiscal austerity: there is to be no fiscal, financial or political union; and there is to be no balanced mechanism for economic adjustment on both sides of the creditor-debtor divide. The decision is, instead, to try still harder with a stability and growth pact whose failures have been both predictable and persistent. Yes, Mr Cameron made a blunder last week. But that of the eurozone looks far bigger.
2011/12/10
2011/12/09
The only way to save the eurozone is to destroy the EU – FT.com
The only way to save the eurozone is to destroy the EU – FT.com
...
The fiscal union likely to be agreed in March may not initially be very effective in resolving the crisis. It focuses on all the wrong issues, mostly fiscal discipline, which is not the real reason why the crisis has spread to Spain or Belgium, for example.
But the eurozone nevertheless made an important political statement. It will not allow outsiders to stand in the way when it needs to act...
Over time it will have to usurp central EU roles, especially in the internal market. I would expect it to create its own internal market inside the existing one. It will have to develop a highly integrated financial market with a single financial supervisor. In particular, I do not believe that the eurozone will allow a situation to persist where its main financial centre is located offshore. It will also want to set labour market rules and co-ordinate tax policies. In all of those areas, the eurozone and the EU will get into a permanent legal and political conflict, in which the EU acts as a brake on the eurozone’s development.
One way or the other, this conflict is bound to lead to an eventual split of the EU. ...
The EU with its current treaties and institutions has proved to be an insufficiently flexible framework to run a monetary union and a disastrous framework for a monetary union in crisis.
These latest developments have reaffirmed my conviction that the only way to save the eurozone is to destroy the EU. But European governments may, of course, end up destroying both. All they did in the early hours of Friday morning was to create a new crisis without resolving the existing one.
...
The fiscal union likely to be agreed in March may not initially be very effective in resolving the crisis. It focuses on all the wrong issues, mostly fiscal discipline, which is not the real reason why the crisis has spread to Spain or Belgium, for example.
But the eurozone nevertheless made an important political statement. It will not allow outsiders to stand in the way when it needs to act...
Over time it will have to usurp central EU roles, especially in the internal market. I would expect it to create its own internal market inside the existing one. It will have to develop a highly integrated financial market with a single financial supervisor. In particular, I do not believe that the eurozone will allow a situation to persist where its main financial centre is located offshore. It will also want to set labour market rules and co-ordinate tax policies. In all of those areas, the eurozone and the EU will get into a permanent legal and political conflict, in which the EU acts as a brake on the eurozone’s development.
One way or the other, this conflict is bound to lead to an eventual split of the EU. ...
The EU with its current treaties and institutions has proved to be an insufficiently flexible framework to run a monetary union and a disastrous framework for a monetary union in crisis.
These latest developments have reaffirmed my conviction that the only way to save the eurozone is to destroy the EU. But European governments may, of course, end up destroying both. All they did in the early hours of Friday morning was to create a new crisis without resolving the existing one.
2011/12/04
Económico-Financeiro: Vamos hoje à terra da pescada, o Chile
Económico-Financeiro: Vamos hoje à terra da pescada, o Chile: Quando eu escrevi que era contra o direito à greve na função pública e nas empresas públicas, um comentador, de forma simples e educada, fez...
2011/12/02
This time they may save the euro - FT.com
This time they may save the euro - FT.com
Take a deep breath. Here is a mad proposition: Europe is about to save the euro. Don’t bet the bank on it. European leaders have shown an unmatched talent for messing things up. But there has been a change in the political dynamics of the continent’s sovereign debt crisis. This time policymakers might just get it right.
Take a deep breath. Here is a mad proposition: Europe is about to save the euro. Don’t bet the bank on it. European leaders have shown an unmatched talent for messing things up. But there has been a change in the political dynamics of the continent’s sovereign debt crisis. This time policymakers might just get it right.
Prioridade do governo: manter a televisão pública « BLASFÉMIAS
Prioridade do governo: manter a televisão pública « BLASFÉMIAS
Os sucessivos governos entendem que para além do preço pago directamente pelos utentes directos de certos serviços, alguns, designados de «interesse público», deverão ser directamente subsidiados por todos os contribuintes (e não apenas pelos utentes), de modo a que o preço do serviço seja mais acessível. Tais verbas disponibilizadas a essas empresas (públicas e privadas), são as chamadas «indeminizações compensatórias».
De entre os vários serviços, qual será o serviço dito «público» que os sucessivos governos entendem como mais essencial, isto é, aquele para o qual os contribuintes vêem sacada maior fatia do seu rendimento?
Cultura? Transportes rodoviários? Transportes ferroviários? Passes sociais? Não: a televisão.
...
Os sucessivos governos entendem que para além do preço pago directamente pelos utentes directos de certos serviços, alguns, designados de «interesse público», deverão ser directamente subsidiados por todos os contribuintes (e não apenas pelos utentes), de modo a que o preço do serviço seja mais acessível. Tais verbas disponibilizadas a essas empresas (públicas e privadas), são as chamadas «indeminizações compensatórias».
De entre os vários serviços, qual será o serviço dito «público» que os sucessivos governos entendem como mais essencial, isto é, aquele para o qual os contribuintes vêem sacada maior fatia do seu rendimento?
Cultura? Transportes rodoviários? Transportes ferroviários? Passes sociais? Não: a televisão.
...
Sweden Is Safest as Crisis Upends Bond Market - Bloomberg
Sweden Is Safest as Crisis Upends Bond Market - Bloomberg: Sweden is enjoying its lowest borrowing cost ever relative to Germany as investors reward the biggest Scandinavian economy for cutting its debt to less than half Europe’s average and enforcing discipline at its banks.
2011/11/30
Does Europe Have a Korean Option? - Simon Johnson - Project Syndicate
Does Europe Have a Korean Option? - Simon Johnson - Project Syndicate:
...
While depreciation would never be eurozone officials’ stated policy, it currently looks like all roads lead in that direction.
Of course, currency depreciation is not a panacea. The South Korean situation also involved difficult steps, including a confrontation between the government and the largest chaebol, some of which had quite blatantly violated the law. After a series of showdowns, in which one company, Daewoo, threatened to default, and political forces rallied to its assistance, the government won; the hugely powerful Daewoo group underwent bankruptcy and restructuring. Overall, South Korea managed to curb its corporate sector’s excessive power (which holds lessons for dealing with today’s mega-banks).
Similarly, Europe needs to fix its deeper structural problems. It needs a fiscal center – much as the United States needed a federal authority to tax in 1787. Indeed, the Europeans need the equivalent of the US Constitutional Convention – and the difficult ratification debate that followed.
But some depreciation of the euro would provide a bridge to reach internal governance reform. And, like it or not, rising pressure on the euro is likely to force European officials to cross it.
...
While depreciation would never be eurozone officials’ stated policy, it currently looks like all roads lead in that direction.
Of course, currency depreciation is not a panacea. The South Korean situation also involved difficult steps, including a confrontation between the government and the largest chaebol, some of which had quite blatantly violated the law. After a series of showdowns, in which one company, Daewoo, threatened to default, and political forces rallied to its assistance, the government won; the hugely powerful Daewoo group underwent bankruptcy and restructuring. Overall, South Korea managed to curb its corporate sector’s excessive power (which holds lessons for dealing with today’s mega-banks).
Similarly, Europe needs to fix its deeper structural problems. It needs a fiscal center – much as the United States needed a federal authority to tax in 1787. Indeed, the Europeans need the equivalent of the US Constitutional Convention – and the difficult ratification debate that followed.
But some depreciation of the euro would provide a bridge to reach internal governance reform. And, like it or not, rising pressure on the euro is likely to force European officials to cross it.
2011/11/28
FT Alphaville » The legal aspects and abstractions of a euro redenomination
FT Alphaville » The legal aspects and abstractions of a euro redenomination
And so it came to pass, that everyone who worried about whether the euros which people owed them would stay euros for much longer…
…realised that this was not a drill.
Case in point — a note by Nomura analysts published over the weekend, which has ruffled a few feathers.
And so it came to pass, that everyone who worried about whether the euros which people owed them would stay euros for much longer…
…realised that this was not a drill.
Case in point — a note by Nomura analysts published over the weekend, which has ruffled a few feathers.
Eurozone is on the way to fiscal union | The A-List | Must-read views on today’s top news stories – FT.com – FT.com
Eurozone is on the way to fiscal union | The A-List | Must-read views on today’s top news stories – FT.com – FT.com
... the scheme for issuing eurozone bonds would ensure that in order to be attractive to overseas investors they are at least as safe as and more liquid than existing high-quality government bonds. It should also involve incentives to fiscal discipline so that participating governments contribute to keeping the new bonds on a sound footing. In view of these criteria, the incentives-focused ‘blue bond’ proposal by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker remains the best on offer...
The German experts’ proposal addresses these concerns by proposing a temporary guarantee scheme covering current debt in excess of 60 per cent of gross domestic product. They envisage the creation of a temporary redemption fund that would benefit from joint and several liability and through which participating countries could issue debt in the next few years until they have reached their quota (namely, their current debt less 60 per cent). This debt would be paid off and gradually extinguished over time. To this end, each participating country would be required to earmark specific tax revenues...
First, the temporary possibility to issue new debt under joint and several liability would give breathing space to countries in trouble, leaving them time to adjust. Second, it would be an instrument to rebuild trust. For these two reasons, it deserves serious consideration.
... the scheme for issuing eurozone bonds would ensure that in order to be attractive to overseas investors they are at least as safe as and more liquid than existing high-quality government bonds. It should also involve incentives to fiscal discipline so that participating governments contribute to keeping the new bonds on a sound footing. In view of these criteria, the incentives-focused ‘blue bond’ proposal by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker remains the best on offer...
The German experts’ proposal addresses these concerns by proposing a temporary guarantee scheme covering current debt in excess of 60 per cent of gross domestic product. They envisage the creation of a temporary redemption fund that would benefit from joint and several liability and through which participating countries could issue debt in the next few years until they have reached their quota (namely, their current debt less 60 per cent). This debt would be paid off and gradually extinguished over time. To this end, each participating country would be required to earmark specific tax revenues...
First, the temporary possibility to issue new debt under joint and several liability would give breathing space to countries in trouble, leaving them time to adjust. Second, it would be an instrument to rebuild trust. For these two reasons, it deserves serious consideration.
Thinking the unthinkable on a euro break-up | Gavyn Davies | Insight into macroeconomics and the financial markets from the Financial Times – FT.com
Thinking the unthinkable on a euro break-up | Gavyn Davies | Insight into macroeconomics and the financial markets from the Financial Times – FT.com
It has suddenly become respectable to ask the question: what would happen if the euro broke up? Last week’s rise in German bond yields signals that a euro break-up is being taken more seriously by investors. I am told that London law firms are allocating large amounts of time to examining the validity, following a break-up, of cross-border contracts written in euros. And, to judge from my own inbox, asset managers are beginning to ask about the economics of how it could occur.
…
… if the euro were to disappear altogether, the extra complication of how to handle all the contracts denominated in euros would be a legal morass which would take many years to resolve, and in the meantime the financing of international trade could collapse for an unknown period of time. (The extraordinary legal complications are discussed here.)
Once investors start to look over this precipice in earnest, the resulting stampede out of all euro-denominated assets could become self-fulfilling. And any disorderly break-up of the euro would, at the very least, result in a period of deep European recession, before the eventual economic recovery could begin.
So serious are the risks that Germany and France are today reported to be contemplating urgent steps to save the euro by adopting earlier fiscal union, and by increasing financial support for peripheral bond markets (Route 3). About time, too.
It has suddenly become respectable to ask the question: what would happen if the euro broke up? Last week’s rise in German bond yields signals that a euro break-up is being taken more seriously by investors. I am told that London law firms are allocating large amounts of time to examining the validity, following a break-up, of cross-border contracts written in euros. And, to judge from my own inbox, asset managers are beginning to ask about the economics of how it could occur.
…
… if the euro were to disappear altogether, the extra complication of how to handle all the contracts denominated in euros would be a legal morass which would take many years to resolve, and in the meantime the financing of international trade could collapse for an unknown period of time. (The extraordinary legal complications are discussed here.)
Once investors start to look over this precipice in earnest, the resulting stampede out of all euro-denominated assets could become self-fulfilling. And any disorderly break-up of the euro would, at the very least, result in a period of deep European recession, before the eventual economic recovery could begin.
So serious are the risks that Germany and France are today reported to be contemplating urgent steps to save the euro by adopting earlier fiscal union, and by increasing financial support for peripheral bond markets (Route 3). About time, too.
2011/11/25
O grande especulador nacional - Sócrates
http://quartarepublica.blogspot.com/2011/11/o-grande-especulador-nacional.html
Dívida Pública Directa do Estado- Fonte: Instituto Gestão do Crédito Público
Março de 2005- 92,7 mil milhões
2011( 30 de Junho)- 172,4 mil milhões
Sócrates cometeu a proeza inimaginável de praticamente duplicar a dívida nos seus seis anos e três meses de governação. 10,6 mil milhões por ano!... E, para coroar a façanha, só nos últimos 25 meses do reinado, endividou-nos em mais cerca de 40 mil milhões!...Claro que teve que começar a pedir emprestado até para pagar os juros.
A especulação tem um nome e é nacional. Mas agora fazem as greves contra o governo e os especuladores internacionais!...
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